The rebalancing of the British economy has become perhaps the central motif in the public political economy of adjustment to the financial crisis. The paper examines the social construction of the rebalancing imperative and associated policies, arguing that rebalancing discourse has served to circumscribe the parameters of acceptable state intervention in response to the crisis. It is, accordingly, to be seen as a temporary exception, after which laissezfaire can be restored. But is there any evidence for such a rebalancing? In the second half of the paper we assess the extent to which its objectives have been realised in substantive economic policy change, demonstrating a disjuncture between the rhetoric and practice of rebalancing a communicative dissonance. This leads us to question not only the extent to which rebalancing has been pursued in public policy, but also the likelihood that the interventions delineated by rebalancing can herald genuine economic change.
Introduction
Though it has its origins in the early 2000s (Froud et al, 2011) , the idea that the British economy is unbalanced has emerged as perhaps the single defining motif of official economic policy discourse in Britain since the global financial crisis. Its analogue, the rebalancing imperative, as we shall term it, has, over this time, become the core principle justifying economic intervention by the state in exceptional times. The concept of rebalancing has been employed by elite policy-makers to refer to a long but relatively coherent list of economic issues, most obviously the contribution of different sectors and different regions to the British economy, but also international trade, and the relative importance of saving and investment in contrast to, respectively, private debt and consumption. Overall, we contend, rebalancing discourse serves in effect to provide a new, if temporally delimited, moral political economy of state intervention: for as long as a strong case for sectoral (or other) rebalancing can be maintained, state intervention to redress that balance is justified. Such state intervention is good, yet by the same token, other forms of state intervention (which cannot be justified in terms of the rebalancing imperative), or the very same state intervention extended beyond the (exceptional) period in which the economy can be shown to be unbalanced, are bad. As such, we contend, rebalancing serves to circumscribe, in public discourse, the parameters of state intervention both sectorally/regionally, in that such state intervention should be limited to initiatives that will serve to restore a (natural) condition of economic balance and temporally, in that the imperative (and the legitimation for intervention it provides) only apply during exceptional times (in which the imbalance persists).
In the context of British economic policy making since the 1980s, this rebalancing discourse is an intriguing and interesting innovation which bears close scrutiny. It is intuitively interesting, we suggest, for four principal reasons: firstly, like many other ostensibly persuasive British economic policy logics in recent years, it is couched as an imperative a non-negotiable and binding constraint if good economic performance is to be restored. Secondly, however, unlike many such non-negotiable economic imperatives (such as competitiveness, fiscal rectitude or central bank independence), it is constituted as an internal rather than an external imperative (on the appeal to external economic imperatives as non-negotiable see, for instance Hay 2004; Hay and Rosamond 2002; Hay and Smith 2005; Watson and Hay 2004) . Thirdly, it is simultaneously both repoliticising and depoliticising: It is repoliticising in the sense that it countenances state intervention where otherwise it would not typically be seen as legitimate and, more specifically, a particular form of state intervention capable of readjusting the boundaries of economic activity. Yet it is also depoliticising in that it presents rebalancing as a logic of no alternative, and as a technical fix to what is presented as a self-evidently technical economic problem.
Finally, and as we have already alluded to, rebalancing constitutes a heavily circumscribed and conditional imperative a license to intervene that is strictly timedelimited and specific to certain limited outcomes. It defines an imperative which seeks to restore a normal condition of balance to the economy, in the exceptional circumstances of imbalance. It posits, in effect, a condition of dynamic stability which the crisis has disrupted (by the conduct of others), and which can only be restored by a degree of state intervention which would not normally be warranted. Yet what is perhaps most intriguing about the rebalancing imperative is that it is difficult (and increasingly difficult) to reconcile with economic policy content. It is difficult to discern the rebalancing that features so prominently, alongside austerity, in the public rationale offered for economic policy change. The same, it need hardly be pointed out, certainly cannot be said of austerity itself.
Interestingly, the diagnosis of the British economy as structurally unbalanced bears some ostensible similarity with the analysis associated with the identification and critique of a privatised Keynesian or Anglo-liberal growth model ALGM see Crouch 2009; Hay 2013; Watson 2010) . Rebalancing and ALGM analysis both draw attention to the component parts of economic growth, rather than judging the health of the economy simply on the basis of aggregate performance as gauged in output growth.
(The key distinction of ALGM analysis in this regard is probably the emphasis placed on the housing market as a source of funds for private consumption, and the apparent decline or stagnation in earnings for many employees in the pre-crisis period, neither of which have featured in the coalition s rhetoric on rebalancing Furthermore, both portray policy-makers as having acted to exacerbate the economy s flaws (or imbalances) in recent years (whether for short-term gain, or through ignorance or negligence, or both). While the specific concept of economic balance has not featured predominantly in ALGM analysis (other than in use of the now standard terms of debate about international trade, for instance), the similarities suggest that rebalancing discourse in offering a diagnosis for Britain s economic ills has at least some analytical merit, and cannot be dismissed as merely a rhetorical device. Even if rebalancing were primarily rhetorical rather than substantive, it would remain appropriate for political economists to subject to scrutiny the rationale for policy action being offered by political leaders, and any progress towards such an anticipated or desired results in terms of economic outcomes. When the case for rebalancing can be made on its own terms, we have even more reason to seek to scrutinise the degree to which the perceived imperative has been acted upon, quite apart from the simple desire to hold politicians to account. This is not to suggest, however, that inquiry into the meaning or discursive implications of rebalancing is not also required, and that such implications do not impinge heavily upon what is knowable about economic balance, and what is achievable through rebalancing. In what follows, we seek to combine an assessment of both.
As such, this article subjects rebalancing, or more precisely progress towards a condition of greater economic balance (within the terms of the discourse), to empirical analysis. It does so by offering a comprehensive assessment of the latest available evidence from official sources a form of immanent critique, in effect (Adorno 1973; Antonio 1981) . It argues, primarily, that there remains and is likely to remain a considerable gulf between the rhetoric of rebalancing, on the one hand, and still largely illusory objective of the sectoral recomposition of the economy, on the other. Striving for balance, rhetorically, has not as yet led to any profound economic change. Moreover, through both its ambiguity and the temporal and sectoral circumscription of the forms of intervention countenanced, the rebalancing imperative may in fact serve to sustain a pre-crisis economic order; evidence of a failure to rebalance is unlikely to dampen enthusiasm for the agenda itself. The first section of the article briefly documents rebalancing discourse, commenting also on some of the apparent implications of its employment for how the British economy and the state s role within it is conceived
The second section offers an overview of how coalition economic policy relates to rebalancing, and the third section, after discussing various analytical issues, presents the empirical analysis. We want to create a fairer and more balanced economy, where we are not so dependent on a narrow range of economic sectors, and where new businesses and economic opportunities are more evenly shared between regions and industries (HM Government, 2010: 9) .
Rebalancing as discourse
This was quickly followed by a speech by the new Prime Minister, David Cameron (2010), which argued that our economy has become more and more unbalanced with our fortunes hitched to a few industries in one corner of the country, while we let other sectors like manufacturing slide )n the coalition produced its plan for growth therefore demonstrating how the rebalancing motif had been implanted into the departmental machinery of Whitehall:
Sustainable growth requires a rebalancing of the UK economy away from a reliance on a narrow range of sectors and regions, to one built on investment and exports, with strong growth more fairly shared across the UK (HM Treasury and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 2011: 28) .
Several rebalancing priorities emerge from the plan for growth and the surrounding discourse: reducing private debt, increasing private savings, increasing business investment, improving the trade balance, boosting sectors other than finance (particularly manufacturing), and boosting regions other than London and the South East. Each might be seen to provide the basis for an evaluation of the Coalition s rebalancing proposition on its own terms (a task to which we turn directly in the next section).
The generally implicit, though sometimes explicit, accusation is that the outgoing Labour government had caused or failed to address the economic problems which now give rise to this agenda. Clearly, the notion of rebalancing suggests that there once was balance, that is, some natural economic balance that it is possible to attain. Expressed in this context, economic balance implicitly exalts the economic order that was evident before New Labour s reckless economic stewardship )n this respect what is important about the discourse of balance, imbalance and rebalancing is that it clearly apportions blame for the crisis and the costs of adjustment to its legacy. Imbalance is an unnatural aberration, the product of poor economic management by others, and rebalancing is a difficult and exceptional challenge which perhaps cannot be expected to yield clear (growth) dividends immediately. That is a comforting and arguably convenient conclusion.
However, rebalancing discourse was employed by Labour in government before 2010, most notably in the Pre-Budget Report (now known as the Autumn Statement) published in 2009. The document contains several references to rebalancing, although usually in relation to specific issues (mainly business investment and exports), rather than in terms of an overall agenda, and usually in relation to an expectation that such rebalancing would occur naturally, post-crisis, rather than as an agenda actively being pursued. It was not, in short, an imperative. Although not using the specific term, in his speech accompanying the Pre-Budget Report, then Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling stated:
[G]rowth will come from more varied sources and not depend as much on the financial sector which will, of course, remain an important part of our economy.
Growth will be driven by fresh opportunities to export as the global economy expands and by investment by business in the key industries of the future (Darling, 2009b ).
This passage is particularly interesting as it implies a quite stark contrast between economic performance at the time and that anticipated in the future (which will be more varied in its sources, less dependent on the financial sector, and so forth) but Cassandra-like way given the improvement in growth performance) that the economy needs rebalancing through a shift to exports and investment rather than debtbased consumption specifically towards long-term investment in productive assets rather than short-term speculative property accumulation. To succeed in this task is necessarily the work of many years (Cable, 2013).
However, in February 2014, after a long silence on the theme, George Osborne also returned to the rebalancing motif. This was, in part, to proclaim the success of rebalancing, arguing for instance that manufacturing and construction were contributing to strong growth results. Yet he added, perhaps tellingly:
[T]he recovery is not yet secure and our economy is still too unbalanced. We cannot rely on consumers alone for our economic growth, as we did in previous decades. And we cannot put all our chips on the success of the City of London, as my predecessors did. Britain is not investing enough. Britain is not exporting enough. There are encouraging signs. Both business investment and exports are forecast to grow But we can t be passive observers of the forecasts We need to roll up our sleeves, get to work and make it happen (Osborne, 2014b) .
)n his Budget speech a month later Osborne explained that a resilient economy is a more balanced economy with more exports, more building, more investment and more manufacturing too We ve got to support our manufacturers if we want to see more growth in our regions Osborne a). It is of course difficult to identify whether these later examples of the Conservatives rebalancing discourse differ from those evident in the 2010-2012 period. Certainly, there is no explicit criticism here of private debt in contrast to Cable s argument though there would at least appear to be an acknowledgement of the increasing importance of private debt to growth a theme we explore in more detail presently. Moreover, and in contrast to earlier quotes and references, rebalancing is here presented not only as an imperative (as something which needs to be done), but as an animating imperative and vision (informing directly what might be done and is being done).
It is worth noting that in his February 2014 speech, Osborne described the City of London as a success the sole caveat being that we have become too dependent on this dynamics. State intervention is limited both temporally and inter-sectorally to encouraging, levering or cajoling sectors closer or further away from the economy s fulcrum so that a natural and self-sustaining balance can be re-secured. Closely related to this is the notion that achieving balance would require only minor, technocratic modifications to economic practice, rather than radical change (see Froud et al, 2011) . For this reason, the primary fiscal levers pulled by the state are minor tax adjustments, rather than, say, major public investment programmes or corporate governance reform )n this sense rebalancing echoes the motif of stability pivotal to
New Labour s economic statecraft Clift and Tomlinson
As such, rebalancing implies a further imperative, albeit for inaction rather than action. In terms of more stringent financial regulation, not throwing the baby out with the bathwater is established as a policy priority, achievable only via sober, technocratic decision-making processes rather than a politicised or emotive response to the financial crisis.
Before discussing the rebalancing agenda in practice (what has been done), it is important to discuss here the relationship between rebalancing and elite discourse on austerity or in other words the extent to which the coalition government s desire to reduce the public deficit has been presented as an issue of economic balance. This is not a straightforward issue. Clearly, the idea that the public finances themselves are unbalanced (between revenue and spending) is commonplace in British politics. Yet in terms of the balance between the public and private sectors, of the sources cited above, only the Conservative Party s election manifesto strongly identifies high levels of public spending as a key source of economic imbalance. Interestingly, however, as explored in the next section, a retreat by the state or public sector is often presented implicitly as a pre-requisite of achieving balance in the private sector. As this suggests, whether seen as complementary or in tension, both themes have played an important discursive role, meaning that rebalancing within the private sector can be usefully explored while avoiding the implication that this is all the coalition government cares about.
Rebalancing as programmatic intent
This section briefly discusses the coalition government s policy programme insofar as it relates to rebalancing. Of course, the main agenda pursued by the government has been cuts in public spending. While not unrelated to rebalancing, this agenda has been presented principally using communicative discourse related to the concept of austerity. Pursuing rebalancing, in contrast, does not automatically necessitate such cuts; indeed, the coalition has frequently sought to highlight areas where new public investment initiatives (despite a significant reduction in general spending) ostensibly boost the rebalancing effort, such as the HS2 rail network.
Yet the notion that the state must get out of the way of the private sector, in order for rebalancing to occur, has animated rebalancing policies to some extent. Deregulatory initiatives such the Red Tape Challenge and so-called bonfire of the quangos were heavily promoted early in the life of the coalition, but have led to relatively few substantive reforms. More important have been changes to taxation, as the government has sought to introduce tax incentives and simplification to encourage private sector economic actors to grow, invest, and create jobs; the main example being the gradual reduction of the main rate of corporation tax to 20 per cent by 2015 (the same rate applied to small firms). There have also been cuts to personal taxes, with a reduction in the top rate of income tax to 45 per cent from 50 per cent, and gradual increases in the income tax personal allowance. These tax cuts of course reduce Exchequer revenue, and are therefore, ostensibly, anti-austerity. Interestingly, the personal tax cuts are also proconsumption. There have, however, been changes which have restricted consumption, such as a higher rate of Value Added Tax, and cuts to social security benefits (although the latter should probably be seen in the context of a broader attempt to incentivise employment; the flagship welfare reform, Universal Credit, costs more than the systems it is replacing, other things being equal (Brewer et al, 2011) ).
The coalition government has proselytised consistently the need to boost manufacturing its early agenda in this regard was laid out in the plan for growth which identified advanced manufacturing as a priority (owever with the partial exception of increased support for university research centres focused on manufacturing, policy has replicated longstanding practices within British industrial policy interventions are aimed at the micro level and generally take the form of soft support, such as advice services, gateway services and the dissemination of best practice (Buigues and Sekkat, 2009 ). More recently, attempts have been made to reduce manufacturers energy costs by removing environmental levies although this probably represents a partial marginalisation of the advanced manufacturing agenda, and should be seen in light of related efforts to support reshoring that is the return of low-skilled manufacturing production to Britain that had previously been offshored facilitated principally by declining relative wages in the British manufacturing sector.
Manufacturers have also, apparently, been the main target of increases to the annual investment allowance, that is, the capital investment that firms are able to offset against their corporation tax liabilities the allowance has been increased gradually to £0.5 million, with this rate persisting to 2015. However, reform of the allowance will have a limited impact on the manufacturing sector, as it relies on investment being funded by retained profits. British manufacturing has become increasingly unprofitable, and in any case, is largely typified by small firms.
In terms of other initiatives in support of investment, the government s flagship National Infrastructure Plan offers a long list of investment ambitions, albeit with the vast majority of funding expected to come from private sources (see Helm, 2013) . The government has also looked to pension funds to invest greater amounts in infrastructure, but the Pension Infrastructure Platform has failed to attract significant support, with most contributions coming from public sector or pseudo-public pension funds. 1 The Bank of England s Funding for Lending scheme was intended to encourage banks to make finance available to the corporate sector, particularly small firms, but it has been used principally to support mortgage lending (its terms were therefore revised by the Bank in November 2013). By abolishing the Regional Development Agencies (replaced in name only by Local Enterprise Partnerships), the government has forgone the approach to regional investment which has traditionally served as a proxy for industrial policy in Britain (Buigues and Sekkat, 2009 ).
Attempts to boost manufacturing have not encompassed efforts to tackle the sector s principal, and longstanding, source of weakness, that is, the unwillingness of British banks to offer long-term finance (Froud et al, 2011; Hay, 2013; Watson and Hay, 1998; Williams et al, 1983) . Finance sector reform is of course an issue relevant to rebalancing in its own right; the coalition government has instituted a new macro-prudential framework for bank regulation (augmenting the micro-prudential framework established by Labour legislated for a ring fence around individual deposits to shield them from risks associated with investment banking, and introduced a levy targeted at discourage excessive short-term borrowing. The government will claim that its regulatory changes in this area have been substantial, yet the agenda is clearly focussed on mitigating banking sector volatility and its effects, rather than reorienting bank lending and investment practices the government s conservative approach is exemplified by the ongoing privatisation, largely unaltered, of the Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Banking Group, forgoing an opportunity to lever reform of bank practices through strategic public ownership. The government has established the Green Investment Bank (GIB), ostensibly to direct investments to activities not well served by private banks, yet the GIB is limited in size and, in fact, not a bank in any meaningful sense (it cannot borrow money or issue credit). attempts to boost the housing market indirectly through low interest rates, perhaps inadvertently through Funding for Lending, both noted above, and directly and deliberately through the mortgage guarantee scheme Help to Buy are incidental to broader efforts to boost business investment, manufacturing, exports, and so forth. It is implausible, however, to suggest that the government is unaware of the role of a strong housing market in facilitating household consumption and, indeed, its less direct role in incentivising banks to lend to individuals rather than industry a crowding out effect .
We should of course not be surprised that the communicative discourse around rebalancing is an imperfect fit for the policy agenda being pursued in practice by the coalition government. It offers a simple idea that cannot possibly convey the motives behind countless, complex policy choices. At the same time, however, it offers a relatively novel means of describing an economic policy agenda that is in fact far from novel, or only novel in the sense that it intensifies practices long evident in British economic statecraft (or adopts new forms of intervention in order to preserve or restore aspects of the British economic model undermined by the financial crisis). In this context, it seems especially important that George Osborne revisited rebalancing discourse in 2014; whatever judgement we may form about its practical implications, rebalancing is certainly something the Conservatives and/or the coalition want to be able to claim has occurred, and still want to be seen to be pursuing.
Evaluating the rebalancing act
This section offers an empirical assessment of rebalancing, that is, progress towards redressing the imbalances highlighted in rebalancing discourse, between the eve of the financial crisis and the present moment (that is, the latest available data at the time of writing). The measures or benchmarks included in this assessment are the relative size of manufacturing and (financial) services in the British economy, and jobs and pay in these sectors; the extent to which bank lending practices have been reoriented, primarily towards manufacturing and away from the housing market; the relative size of different regions in the British economy, and employment and pay across the regions; median earnings and the earnings distribution; the relative importance of household consumption and (business) investment within GDP; the trade balance, and the extent to which the export base has been reoriented towards manufactured goods and emerging economies; the ratio of house prices to earnings, the level of mortgage approvals, and the extent of housing equity withdrawal; the extent of consumer borrowing, and the ratio of debt to disposable income, and; the savings ratio. Table 1 summarises the progress, or otherwise, explored in more detail below. 
Investment and consumption

Proportion of GDP Late 2013
Proportion of GDP accounted for by consumption unchanged; significant reduction for investment, including small reduction for business investment
Housing market
Size of market Early 2014
Significant reduction in the total value of mortgage approvals
House prices Early 2014
Average prices now surpassed pre-crisis peak, although large regional differences with London and the South-East significantly above peak, and Northern regions still significantly below House price/earnings ratio 2013 Slight fall in ratio of average price to median earnings, and lower quartile price to lower quartile earnings
Housing equity withdrawal Late 2013
Fewer transactions and more housebuilding means equity is now being created rather than withdrawn
Debt and savings
Savings ratio Early 2014
Small rise in savings ratio compared to 2007, but with ratio declining significantly as the economy returns to growth
Household debtto-income ratio 2013 Significant fall in debt-to-income ratio, but forecast to return to pre-crisis levels over the next few years
Earnings
Median earnings 2013 Significant reduction in full-time earnings, exacerbated by shift to lower-paid part-time employment and self-employment Earnings distribution 2013 Largely unchanged, although higher earners now earn slightly more as proportion of national average, and lower earners earn slightly less
There are, however, several analytical issues that must be explored initially. Firstly, an assessment of public-to-private sector rebalancing is beyond the scope of this article, since, as explored above, reducing the size of the public sector is seen to arise from the imperative of austerity rather than rebalancing in coalition discourse. Additionally, the public/private sector boundary is far from straightforward, and indeed can be directly manipulated by government. By contrast, and secondly, evidence on both the housing market and earnings is included, despite the fact that neither appears to have been identified as a rebalancing priority. Given the role the housing market has played in supporting household consumption in recent years (Watson 2010 ; Hay 2013), we consider evidence on its performance paramount to assessing the extent of economic change. Moreover, both this role for the housing market and the apparent decline or stagnation in earnings for many individuals are highlighted in ALGM analysis as key parts of the (flawed) pre-crisis economic model in the UK.
A third issue relates to the limitations of official data sources. There are of course inherent problems of time lag and definition: by the time evidence about a given trend is collected or codified, the trend may have changed (this problem is of course compounded by the time lag in the creation and publication of any assessment based on this evidence). More importantly, it must be recognised that official data are subject to the institutional dynamics and ideational pressures acting upon its creators, and may in some cases represent a strategic act by the creators in pursuance of a particular goal.
Such problems are largely inescapable; the breadth of measures employed here mitigates, to some extent, against the imperfections inherent in each individual measure, but generally speaking, this means than any empirical analysis based on official data must be presented, and interpreted, cautiously.
Finally, there is the question of whether it is fair to evaluate the government s success in rebalancing the economy at this stage (that is, summer 2014). Problematically, while some of the evidence included here is relatively current, at the time of writing, in some cases the latest available evidence is much earlier than 2014 (2012, for instance, in the case of regional output data). Typically, however, the evidence presented here relates the pre-crisis period to the end of 2013 or early 2014. It is of course correct to say that rebalancing may occur in the future, or may be happening presently, as a result of changes enacted by the coalition government, even if not yet evident (evidence from official forecasts is also presented below, where available, to partially alleviate this problem although forecasts clearly compound many of the problems related to the production of official statistics). However, even if all the data were current, and forecasts were wholly reliable, it may still be the case that the success of rebalancing, or otherwise, cannot be judged over such a short period of time. A number of responses to this charge are possible. Firstly, evaluating progress now does not preclude subsequent evaluation, and may indeed be useful to policy-makers insofar as they are able to chart progress to date. Secondly, whether credible in its own terms or not, rebalancing has been presented as a coalition government priority and the coalition was not designed to last beyond 2015. Having said this, and thirdly, it is necessary to reiterate that the analysis here is not designed simply to evaluate the economic policy performance of the coalition government. The first section noted that rebalancing is not exclusively a coalition agenda and the second section noted that the coalition s economic policy programme has not focused on rebalancing to any meaningful extent. Moreover, the analysis includes issues which have not featured significantly in coalition discourse on rebalancing. It is best conceived as an evaluation of post-crisis change within the British economy albeit an agenda for change which the coalition government is, in large part, almost £36 billion (it is useful to consider trade data over a longer period than a single year, because year-on-year fluctuations tend to be significant). The value of total imports has increased over this period, but the value of exports has increased at a slightly faster rate. However, when the sectoral composition of the export base is considered in more detail, the rebalancing story seems somewhat less convincing. growth because the growth they expected previously did not materialise, nor did the business investment (see OBR, 2010; 2012; 2014) . However, no evidence for this view is presented; this does not necessarily make it an unreasonable assumption, although no such association was evident during the immediate pre-crisis period, when strong overall GDP growth did not coincide with strong business investment growth.
Housing market
The housing market has not recovered all of the ground lost as a result of the financial crisis and recession. The value of total mortgage approvals in January 2014 The prevalence of housing equity withdrawal (the difference between net secured lending to households, and increases in the stock of housing wealth when either new properties are built, or improvements are made to existing ones) was an important feature of the pre-crisis growth model, and helped to fund consumption despite the squeeze on earnings (ay From late 2006 to late 2007, an average of almost £9 billion in housing equity per quarter was withdrawn per quarter. However, housing equity is no longer being withdrawn on this scale, and indeed withdrawals are now negative, with an average of almost -£12 billion per quarter being withdrawn from late 2012 to late 2013. 10 The Bank of England, however, has suggested that this reversal does not in fact represent a fundamental economic change, but rather reflects the fact that fewer housing transactions are restricting the opportunity for equity withdrawals (Reinold, 2011) , and that a higher rate of housebuilding (associated with Help to Buy) has led to the creation of new equity (Stewart, 2013) .
Debt and savings
The savings ratio (household saving as a proportion of total household resources) appears initially to have been the most successful example of rebalancing since 2010.
The ratio has increased from 3 per cent in the third quarter of 2007, to 5 per cent in the first quarter of 2014. To put this into context, the savings ratio was only 3.9 per cent in the third quarter of 2001. However, this simple account ignores the relationship between the phase of the business cycle and saving. The saving ratio actually climbed dramatically before the coalition government took office, to around 8 per cent throughout and early and the most recent figure is a snapshot in a saving ratio that has since declined significantly. Indeed, the OBR (2014) forecasts that the savings ratio will fall back further, declining to 3.6 per cent as early as 2016. During the last recession, in the early 1990s, the savings ratio peaked at a higher rate, around 11 per cent, and did decline significantly for several years afterwards. It is reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the economy has not witnessed an unusually large swing towards savings. 11
Similarly, there is some evidence that households are reducing indebtedness yet this may prove to be illusory. The household debt-to-income ratio (total financial liabilities as a proportion of gross disposable income) has fallen to 141 in 2013, from a height of 169 in 2007. 12 The OBR (2014) , however, forecasts that, rather than continuing to decline, the ratio will actually return (almost) to its pre-crisis level by 2019. The amount owed in consumer debt has fallen to £161 billion in January 2014 from £191 billion in January 2007, but this is still much higher than the £116 billion owed in January 2000. 
The failure of rebalancing?
Although our analysis is inevitably partial, it is appropriate to conclude that, on the basis of the available evidence, there is little sign of rebalancing within the British economy, on the terms publicly espoused primarily by the coalition government. Should we therefore conclude that rebalancing has failed? It is worth reiterating the caveats that such rebalancing may yet occur, and that our analysis covers issues not included substantively in coalition discourse. It should also be noted that the absence of (progress towards) balance may be due to circumstances over which the government has no meaningful control. This argument implies the existence of external constraints on what national-level governments may achieve, even in relation to the domestic economy. It clearly has some merit; arguing that rebalancing has not occurred is not the same as arguing that it could easily have been achieved if the government had been more committed to the agenda. On the other hand, the coalition government have undoubtedly claimed that rebalancing is possible.
The underlying issue here, of course, is whether we should expect policy-makers communicative discourse to match reality to any meaningful extent )t would be naïve to claim that the mismatch presented here is anything other than normal political fare;
indeed, there is little basis for claiming that the mismatch related to rebalancing were any more pronounced than we would usually expect. However, despite this, it is relevant that the main thrust of coalition economic policy appears to have been relatively unconcerned with bringing about rebalancing, or at least highly disconnected from the publicly espoused agenda. Furthermore, it is also relevant that the government now appears to be claiming that rebalancing is happening. This rhetorical shift is achieved by removing some priorities from the presentation of the rebalancing agenda, such as reducing private debt, or by adopting far less stringent measures than those used here (such as evidence of any growth in manufacturing or Northern regions, irrespective of its relative strength) (see Osborne, 2014a; 2014b) . This highlights the central ambiguity inherent in rebalancing discourse: it is a discourse that was always bound to offer some scope for claiming success, insofar as mundane economic circumstances can be described as evidence of rebalancing. The ostensible failure of rebalancing to date indicates that the main purpose of the discourse is not to win support for an ambitious policy programme, but rather to offer the appearance that radical change is being pursued, therefore offering accommodation to moderate critics such as Vince Cable by demonstrating a shared agenda, while at the same time legitimating the basic features of the existing economic order. The question of whether rebalancing has failed is trumped therefore by the sense that rebalancing is both eminently achievable, in that it can be moulded to suit particular circumstances, but also quintessentially unachievable, in that it rests upon a simplistic vision of the British economy which appears to have been proven, in practice, impermeable to the highly circumscribed forms of state intervention countenanced by the rebalancing imperative.
)t is in this context that we refer to what might be termed the communicative dissonance of rebalancing discourse a consistent disjuncture between, on the one hand, the avowed central objective of government policy (at least as communicated publicly) and, on the other, the broad contours of substantive government economic policy making as gauged by a detailed analysis of policy content and implementation.
Though communicative dissonance is, of course, to be expected in all areas of public policy-making and from one administration to another (communicative discourse rarely corresponds in any one-to-one fashion with policy content), it is, we would contend, a particularly distinctive feature of the coalition s economic agenda At a time of acknowledged economic crisis, that is perhaps both a surprising and a significant observation. We see little if any evidence that rebalancing has actively been attempted (even assessed in the coalition s own terms and yet plenty of evidence that rebalancing has been the defining public mantra of its period of economic policy tenure. As such, we suggest, rebalancing cannot be judged a failure; for there is as yet no rebalancing agenda to fail.
Conclusion
Assessing the extent to which the British economy has rebalanced offers a useful insight into the extent of economic change following the financial crisis. Though the evaluation offered in this article cannot be considered comprehensive, and indeed covers issues that have not been an explicit part of the coalition government s public espoused rebalancing imperative, it does help us to provide perhaps the first assessment of the coalition s economic policy on its own terms. Of course, it is precisely because the assessment is framed by the coalition s own rhetoric on economic change that we might expect some progress to have been made towards economic balance. That this appears not to be the case, with even the limited signs of progress in some areas likely to prove illusory, is surely telling.
We could conclude that this apparent (if, as we have argued, somewhat misleading) failure is due to the inability of national-level governments to achieve substantial economic change, especially over a short timeframe, or because rebalancing has not been pursued in practice by policy-makers, despite their public pronouncements.
However, whilst neither conclusion is wrong, each in our view misreads and misinterprets the purpose of rebalancing discourse, that is, to communicate the coalition government s plans and expectations around the economy in a particular way, for public consumption. On the assessment offered here, rebalancing is not being achieved, but the imagery of balance and the rebalancing imperative and the implicit moral political economy on which it rests allows the coalition to escape responsibility for any failure on its part to achieve the rebalancing it ostensibly seeks, whilst continuing to apportion blame to others for the imbalance it is forced to seek to redress.
Progress towards rebalancing is good (if slow); lack of progress is merely an index of the extent of the mess it inherited from its predecessor. More generally, the absence of any substantive progress to date has not deterred the coalition government from continuing to claim that rebalancing is both desirable and possible seemingly because it offers a narrative which appears to endorse radical change, while at the same time legitimating the current economic order.
Notes
The Pension Infrastructure Platform was announced by the government in 2011,
and is managed by the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF). In contrast to an initial target of £20 billion, it has attracted only around £1 billion in soft commitments, with only £260 million of this committed at the time of writing. Of the ten funds offering soft commitments, three are conglomerates of local government pension funds, and four are funds related to previously nationalised industries. They are joined by the Lloyds TSB Group Pension Schemes of which the sponsoring company is publicly owned in large part and the Pension Protection Fund, a government-sponsored body which administers the pensions of members of insolvent funds (Mann, 2013; NAPF, 2014 
